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COMMENT 
Cap and Trade Meets the Interstate 
Commerce Clause: Are Greenhouse Gas 
Regulations Constitutional after Lopez and 
Morrison? 
ILAN W. GUTHERZ 
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez1 and 
United States v. Morrison2 have caused legal scholars to question 
the enduring constitutionality of some of our nation’s key 
environmental laws.3  However, no one has yet examined the 
impact these decisions could have on federal proposals to address 
global climate change.4 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law; M.E.M. Candidate, Yale 
University School of Forestry & Environmental Studies.  Thank you to Professor 
Karl Coplan for his advice in the development of this topic and to PACE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW Editors Elizabeth Bennett and Jennifer McAleese 
for their comments and guidance throughout the writing process. 
 1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 2. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2003); Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and 
the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 387-89 (2006); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 405-06 (2005); Bradford C. 
Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act Constitutional 
Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375 (2007); Matthew B. 
Baumgartner, SWANCC’s Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137 
(2005). 
 4. As used in this Comment, “climate change” refers to a number of related 
changes to the earth’s prevailing weather patterns that are caused by the 
buildup of heat-trapping (“greenhouse”) gases in the atmosphere.  These 
changes include: higher average temperatures and significant deviations from 
historical temperature norms across the globe; rising sea levels as a result of 
greater summer melt and lesser winter freezing of the ice pack at the poles; 
1
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This Comment attempts to answer that question.  Part I of 
this Comment begins by sketching the history of American 
involvement in combating climate change.  Part I also briefly 
explains the three leading policy options for regulating 
greenhouse gases in the U.S.: “cap-and-trade,” “command-and-
control” regulations, and a tax on carbon.  In Part II, I discuss the 
significance of Lopez and Morrison to our present understanding 
of the Interstate Commerce Clause.  In Part III, I apply the 
Court’s current Commerce Clause framework to the leading 
options for limiting the emission of greenhouse gases.  Part III 
lays out the main constitutional arguments against and in favor 
of these options, and draws on proposed legislation and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations for 
examples.  In Part IV, I conclude that the Court’s current 
approach to the Commerce Clause raises the possibility that 
comprehensive greenhouse gas regulations could be ruled 
unconstitutional, and that the answer will ultimately depend on 
how the Court characterizes the challenged law.  I also offer a 
series of recommendations that will improve the chances that a 
greenhouse gas regulatory system will withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, even under the Court’s post-Lopez Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. 
I.  FEDERAL REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE 
GASES 
Since the 1970s, the United States, along with the rest of the 
world, has committed itself (in theory, at least) to stabilizing the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at levels 
 
increasing frequency of severe weather events such as storms, droughts, and 
floods; and changes (both increases and decreases) to prevailing levels of 
precipitation.  See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE 16-18 (2008), available at http://dels-old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_ 
briefs/climate_change_2008_final.pdf.  Although it is not among the effects of 
“climate change,” the increase of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere has 
also been linked to increasing acidification of the oceans, as CO2 is dissolved in 
seawater and converted to carbonic acid.  See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCIENCES, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO MEET THE 
CHALLENGES OF A CHANGING OCEAN (2010). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
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that will prevent the worst consequences of climate change.5  In 
the United States, legislation to limit the emission of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs)6 from the industrial sector has been introduced in 
every Congress since at least 1988.7  Starting in 2009, in response 
to Massachusetts v. EPA,8 the EPA began to promulgate 
regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions from both mobile9 
and stationary sources10 under the authority of the Clean Air Act 
(CAA).11  Around the same time, the U.S. House of 
 
 5. See National Climate Program Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 
601, §§ 3, 5 (1978) (requiring the President to establish a program to “assist the 
Nation and the world to understand and respond to natural and man-induced 
climate processes and their implications”).  The United States is also a signatory 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose 
objective is “to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/resource 
/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
 6. Generally, the greenhouse gases that legislators have sought to limit are: 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), and several other 
lesser-known industrial gases.  See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 711(a) (as passed by the House, June 26, 
2009). 
 7. See Global Environmental Protection Act of 1988, S. 2666, 100th Cong. 
(1988) (introduced by Sen. Stafford) (regulating chlorofluorocarbons, carbon 
dioxide, ground level ozone, methane, and other pollutants); see also National 
Energy Policy Act of 1988, S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1988) (introduced by Sen. 
Wirth) (calling for national energy policy to reduce global warming); Global 
Warming Prevention Act of 1988, S. 2867, 100th Cong. (1988) (introduced by 
Sen. Chafee) (establishing national policies and promoting international efforts 
in resource conservation strategies appropriate to preventing greenhouse effect); 
Global Warming Prevention Act of 1988, H.R. 5460, 100th Cong. (1988) 
(introduced by Rep. Schneider) (putting forth House version of S. 2867). 
 8. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the EPA must 
determine, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, whether greenhouse gases cause or 
contribute to air pollution that will endanger public health or welfare). 
 9. See Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 
Fed. Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009). 
 10. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule (Proposed Rule), 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009).  This rule 
became finalized on June 3, 2010. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 70, and 71). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2006). 
3
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Representatives debated and passed the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act,12 which would have capped emissions of GHGs 
from most major sources and required regulated industries to 
obtain allowances for every ton of GHG emitted.13 
These two types of policies represent the leading approaches 
to reducing emissions of GHGs in the United States.  Under the 
first approach, which is known as “command-and-control,”14 EPA 
or an authorized state agency issues permits to emitters of GHGs.  
These permits set a ceiling on the volume of specified GHGs that 
each source can emit.15  EPA and the states monitor these 
emissions and impose penalties on sources that exceed their 
permits,16 thereby inducing polluters to reduce their emissions.  
The second approach to regulating GHGs, “cap-and-trade,” builds 
on the command-and-control model, but adds a market trading 
component to the regulatory scheme in order to reduce the costs 
of compliance.17  Under a national cap-and-trade system, the 
federal government identifies an overall nation-wide target (a 
“cap”) for emissions of GHGs, and divides that target into 
“emission allowances.”18  These allowances operate like permits 
under a command-and-control scheme — that is, an entity 
holding allowances for X tons of GHGs may emit only that 
amount of GHGs in one year, or suffer a penalty.19 
The major distinction between cap-and-trade and command-
and-control is that under cap-and-trade, the allowances can be 
 
 12. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(as passed by the House, Jun. 26, 2009). 
 13. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 was never brought 
to a vote in the Senate. 
 14. See Camille V. Otero-Phillips, What's in the Forecast? A Look at the EPA's 
Use of Computer Models in Emissions Trading, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. 
L.J. 187, 193 (1998). 
 15. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse 
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514-01 (June 3, 2010) (establishing phased-
in schedule under which large emitters must obtain CAA permits to emit carbon 
dioxide). 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7420(2)(A) (2006). 
 17. See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap and Trade Rehabilitated: Using Tradable 
Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gases, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 42, 43 
(2009). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
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bought and sold (i.e., “traded”) on the open market.20  Thus, if a 
particular GHG emitter wishes to emit more GHGs in a given 
year than her existing allowances would permit, she can buy 
extra allowances from other emitters who do not plan on emitting 
all of the GHGs authorized by their own allowances.  For this 
reason, cap-and-trade is, in theory, more efficient than a 
command-and-control system.21 
A third approach to reducing GHG emissions, a “carbon tax,” 
has also received significant attention.22  Under a carbon tax 
approach, emitters of GHGs would pay a tax for each unit of GHG 
they release into the atmosphere.23  The theory behind such an 
approach is that putting a price on GHG emissions will naturally 
drive polluters to reduce their emissions in order to improve their 
own bottom line.  Notwithstanding the potential of a carbon tax 
to reduce GHG emissions, this Comment focuses exclusively on 
command-and-control regulation and cap-and-trade.  These two 
options are far more interesting from a legal perspective than a 
carbon tax for two reasons.  First, cap-and-trade and command-
and-control regulations present greater constitutional difficulties 
than the relatively straightforward carbon tax.24  Second, cap-
and-trade and, to a lesser extent, command-and-control 
regulations, are both more popular and more likely to be 
implemented in our lifetimes.  Therefore the constitutionality of 
these options is a much more pressing legal question than is the 
constitutionality of a carbon tax. 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote 
Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J.  ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247, 
249 (1989). 
 22. See generally JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40242, CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS AND 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40242.pdf. 
 23. See id. 
 24. This is because, regardless of its constitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause, a carbon tax scheme will almost definitely be upheld as a proper 
exercise of Congress’s Taxing Power.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
5
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II.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AFTER UNITED 
STATES V. LOPEZ 
A. Background: the Commerce Clause from the 1940s to 
the 1990s 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”25  
Since the 1940s, when the Court decided United States v. Darby26 
and Wickard v. Filburn,27 the Supreme Court has held that this 
Clause, in combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause,28 
authorizes congressional regulation of, among other things, the 
wages private businesses pay their employees;29 the small-scale, 
intrastate production of agricultural commodities for personal 
consumption;30 the racially discriminatory practices of small 
businesses that engage in interstate commerce31 or use products 
obtained through interstate commerce;32 and even the wholly 
intrastate use of private land if it is used to mine coal.33  Until 
recently, the Court construed Congress’s ability to regulate all 
manner of intrastate activities under the authority of the 
Commerce Clause so liberally that then-Associate Justice William 
Rehnquist complained that “[a]lthough it is clear that the people, 
through the States, delegated authority to Congress to ‘regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States,’ one could easily get the 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 26. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 27. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 28. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 29. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 125. 
 30. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-29. 
 31. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 
(1964). 
 32. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
 33. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 282 (1981) (regulation of environmental effects of coal mining was 
constitutional because “[t]he prevention of . . . destructive interstate competition 
is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
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sense from this Court’s opinions that the federal system exists 
only at the sufferance of Congress.”34 
However, beginning in 1995 with United States v. Lopez,35 
the present Court has retreated from its predecessors’ expansive 
and highly deferential view of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause.36  In Lopez, the Court held that a federal 
statute criminalizing gun possession in schools exceeded the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.37  Then, in United States v. 
Morrison, the Court ruled that a federal law establishing a cause 
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence also exceeded 
the scope of the Commerce Clause.38  Most recently, in Gonzalez 
v. Raich, the Court narrowly upheld provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act39 as applied to petitioners who wished to possess 
or grow marijuana at home for personal medicinal purposes.40 
B. The Lopez-Morrison Framework 
Under the Court’s new approach to the Commerce Power, 
Congress still possesses broad authority to regulate the “channels 
of interstate commerce” and “instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” even if 
 
 34. Id. at 307-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3) (emphasis added). 
 35. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 36. See id. at 602  (Stevens, J., dissenting) (protesting “the radical character 
of the Court’s holding” in Lopez); id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“it seems fair to ask whether the step taken by the Court today does anything 
but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court 
extricated itself almost 60 years ago.”); id. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “the majority's holding runs contrary to modern Supreme Court 
cases that have upheld congressional actions despite connections to interstate or 
foreign commerce that are less significant than the effect of school violence.”); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the majority departed from previous Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence in striking down the Violence Against Women Act); id. at 656 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “history, precedent, and legal logic militate 
against the majority’s approach”). 
 37. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 38. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
 39. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CSA), 
Pub. L. No. 91–513, Title II (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 40. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
7
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the object of regulation is found or takes place within a single 
state.41  “Channels” are the conduits through which commerce 
moves, including “navigable rivers, lakes, and canals of the 
United States; the interstate railroad track system; the interstate 
highway system; . . . interstate telephone and telegraph lines; air 
traffic routes; [and] television and radio broadcast frequencies.”42  
“Instrumentalities,” in contrast, are the physical objects — 
automobiles, railroad cars, airplanes, barges — that move goods 
and people across state lines.43  This category also includes goods 
that are transported across state lines.44 
In addition to these well-defined categories, Congress may, 
under certain conditions, regulate intrastate activities that 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.45  Under the Lopez-
Morrison framework, this third category is subject to three 
limitations: the regulated activities must be economic;46 non-
economic activities may not be regulated based on their aggregate 
impact on interstate commerce;47 and the relationship between 
the regulated activity and its effect on interstate commerce must 
not be indirect or attenuated.48 
i. Regulated Activities Must Be “Economic Endeavors” 
First, and most importantly, a law regulating wholly intra-
state activity may only reach activities that are “economic in 
nature.”49  An “economic activity,” is one that relates to 
“commerce” or some form of “economic enterprise.”50  
 
 41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 42. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 43. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (aircraft is one 
example of an “instrumentalit[y] of interstate commerce”). 
 44. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 45. Id. at 559. 
 46. Id. at 560. 
 47. Id. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 48. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. 
 49. Id. at 613 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60). 
 50. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
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“Economics,” according to the Court, “refers to ‘the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”51 
In judging whether the regulated activity is an “economic 
endeavor,”52 the Court does not appear to care whether the 
activity could be undertaken for financial gain under certain 
circumstances.  Instead, the Court requires the regulated activity 
to be, by its nature, “economic.”53  This approach requires the 
Court to view the object of regulation in a narrow, abstract way.  
For example, in Lopez, a majority of the Court determined that 
the mere possession of a gun in a school zone was not an 
“economic” activity,54 despite the fact that Alfonso Lopez, the 
defendant, had carried his firearm to school as part of a business 
transaction.55  Thus, in Lopez, the Court focused its analysis on 
the intrinsic nature of the regulated activity (possession of a gun 
in a school zone) in the abstract, without regard to the 
(apparently extrinsic) fact that the activity was, in reality, 
undertaken for “economic” reasons.56 
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, the Court held that 
“[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence” could not 
be justified under the Commerce Clause because it was “not 
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in 
interstate commerce . . . .”57  Thus, the Morrison Court, too, 
focused on whether the challenged law was explicitly “directed at” 
 
 51. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). 
 52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. 
 53. See id. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
 54. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“The possession of a gun in a local school zone is 
in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”). 
 55. Lopez had been promised forty dollars in exchange for delivering the gun 
to another student, who needed the weapon so he could participate in an after-
school “gang war.”  See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 
1993), aff'd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 56. The Lopez majority accepted that “depending on the level of generality, 
any activity can be looked upon as commercial.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565.  
However, it explicitly rejected such an expansive view of the scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Power because it would “bid fair to convert congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States” and thereby erase the “distinction between what is truly national and 
what is truly local.”  Id. at 567-68. 
 57. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (emphasis added). 
9
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economic activity, and rejected the government’s argument that 
“the nationwide, aggregated impact” of the regulated activity 
would have “substantial effects on employment, production, 
transit, or consumption.”58 
Finally, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),59 and again in 
Rapanos v. United States — two decisions involving Congress’s 
power to regulate the filling of isolated wetlands under the Clean 
Water Act — the Court suggested that allowing the federal 
government to regulate the dumping of fill material in isolated, 
non-navigable wetlands would “stretch[] the outer limits of 
Congress’s commerce power and raise[] difficult questions about 
the ultimate scope of that power.”60  The majority came to this 
conclusion in spite of the fact that the dumping in both cases was 
clearly “undertaken for economic reasons.”61  Thus, under the 
Court’s post-Lopez understanding of the Commerce Clause, the 
mere fact that a regulated activity is motivated by economic 
incentives (in Lopez, financial gain from acting as a gun courier; 
in SWANCC and Rapanos, financial gain from developing and 
selling land) or might otherwise affect interstate commerce (as 
was the case in Morrison) is not sufficient to bring the activity 
itself into the ambit of federal regulation. 
Chief Justice Roberts (who was serving on the D.C. Circuit 
when Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Rapanos were decided) has 
also made clear that, in his view, Commerce Clause analysis 
must focus on the regulated activity itself and not the reason it is 
being done or the effect it has on other, unregulated economic 
activities.  In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, then-Court of Appeals 
 
 58. Id. at 615. 
 59. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 60. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality 
opinion) (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173); see also id. at 776 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (warning that federal regulation of wetlands that lack “a significant 
nexus [to navigable waters] . . . appear[s] likely, as a category, to raise 
constitutional difficulties and federalism concerns”). 
 61. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In SWANCC, the 
petitioners had sought to fill several isolated ponds in order to build a landfill to 
receive solid waste from a number of municipalities in the Chicago area.  See id. 
at 162-63.  In Rapanos, respondents had attempted to fill isolated wetlands in 
order to develop and sell their land for profit.  See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719-20. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
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Judge Roberts dissented from a denial of rehearing en banc in a 
Commerce Clause challenge to the Endangered Species Act 
because, in his view, the majority’s opinion “ask[ed] whether the 
challenged regulation substantially affects interstate commerce, 
rather than whether the activity being regulated does so.”62  Such 
a focus, according to Roberts, was “inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in United States v. Lopez and United States v. 
Morrison.”63 
In sum, post-Lopez, the majority’s approach to Commerce 
Clause analysis requires a court to focus only on whether the 
regulated activity is, intrinsically, “economic in nature.”64  
Moreover, even regulations that curtail some activities which are 
clearly undertaken for financial gain, or regulations which 
themselves have a strong effect on interstate commerce, will not 
pass constitutional muster unless they are “directed at” economic 
activity. 
ii. Unless They Are an Integral Part of a Larger 
Economic Regulation, Non-Economic Activities 
May Not Be Aggregated 
The second limit on regulations that “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce is related to the first.  Under Lopez, a law 
that broadly regulates both “economic” and “non-economic” 
activities together, without distinguishing between the two, will 
 
 62. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); accord id. at 1159 (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting).  See also GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (“Neither the plain language of the Commerce Clause, nor judicial 
decisions construing it, suggest that . . . Congress may regulate activity (here, 
Cave Species takes) solely because non-regulated conduct (here, commercial 
development) by the actor engaged in the regulated activity will have some 
connection to interstate commerce. . . .  To accept [such an] analysis would allow 
application of otherwise unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not 
to non-commercial actors.  There would be no limit to Congress’ authority to 
regulate intrastate activities, so long as those subjected to the regulation were 
entities which had an otherwise substantial connection to interstate 
commerce.”). 
 63. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 64. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
11
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not pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.65  
This is so even if the non-economic activity, in the aggregate, 
would substantially affect interstate commerce.66  This limitation 
on Congressional power constitutes a significant change from the 
more liberal “aggregation principle” the Court adopted in 
Wickard v. Filburn.67  In Wickard, the Supreme Court held that 
even activities which by themselves have only a trivial effect on 
interstate commerce — for example, the on-farm consumption of 
wheat grown for personal use — may be regulated if the 
aggregate effect of these activities taken together would impact 
interstate commerce.68  To justify its departure from the Wickard 
rule, the Morrison and Lopez Courts explained previous 
Commerce Clause decisions this way: “[I]n every case where we 
have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle 
in Wickard v. Filburn the regulated activity was of an apparent 
commercial character.”69 
The Lopez Court, however, created an important exception to 
this rule.  A law that regulates some non-economic behavior may 
still be considered constitutional if it comprises “an essential part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate 
activity were regulated.”70  If such a larger statutory scheme 
exists, “the de minimis character of individual instances arising 
 
 65. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (taking issue with 
the fact that the challenged law did not explicitly limit its reach “to a discrete 
set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or 
effect on interstate commerce”). 
 66. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (rejecting “the argument that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce”). 
 67. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4 (citation omitted).  Unfortunately, the 
Court has declined to describe what makes an activity “apparently commercial.”  
It is important to note that at least one circuit has argued that the new 
commercial-non-commercial dichotomy enunciated in Lopez is not as stark as 
that decision implies.  United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(arguing that dicta in Morrison leaves open the possibility that non-economic 
activity may still be “aggregated” under the principles of Wickard v. Filburn). 
 70. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). 
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under that statute is of no consequence.”71  Relying on this 
exception, the Court in Gonzales v. Raich upheld a federal law 
banning marijuana possession (which, in some instances, was 
purely intra-state and non-economic) because the ban was an 
essential component of otherwise constitutional federal regulation 
of “quintessentially economic” activities.72 
iii. The Link Between the Regulated Activity and its 
Effect on Commerce Must Not be Indirect or 
Attenuated 
The third limitation on laws affecting interstate commerce is 
that the link between the regulated activity and its impact on 
interstate commerce must not be attenuated.73  The Court has 
declared that Congress’s power over commerce “may not be 
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so 
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex 
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what 
is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.”74  For this reason, even extensive congressional 
findings describing the link between the regulated activity and its 
effect on interstate commerce will not save a statute if the Court 
determines that the link between the regulation and its 
commercial effect is too indirect.75  As many observers have 
noted,76 the motivating factor behind this heightened scrutiny 
over congressional decision-making appears to be concern for 
 
 71. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558) (holding that a ban 
on marijuana possession under the Federal Controlled Substances Act was 
constitutional as applied to petitioners who grew marijuana at home for 
medicinal use or obtained it for free from neighbors). 
 72. Id. at 25-27. 
 73. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000). 
 74. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. 
 75. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15. 
 76. See e.g., Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2003); Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the 
Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 388-394 (2006); 
Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act 
Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 397 
(2007). 
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ensuring a more robust federalism — one that guarantees that 
the states will retain authority over their “traditional” areas of 
control, including criminal law,77 family law,78 education,79 and 
land use.80 
Whatever its motivation, the present Court appears to have 
discarded (in practice, if not in name) the highly deferential 
“rational basis” test it long adhered to in favor of a stricter 
standard.81  Today, in evaluating whether an activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, the Court will no 
longer “pile inference upon inference” in order to find that such a 
relationship exists.82  Rather, “[w]hether particular operations 
affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the 
constitutional power of Congress to regulate them” is now a 
“judicial rather than a legislative question [that] can be settled 
finally only by [the Supreme] Court.”83 
III.  THE EFFECT OF LOPEZ AND MORRISON ON 
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATIONS 
The Supreme Court has yet to take up a Commerce Clause 
challenge to federal regulations of greenhouse gases.  However, 
the Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases indicate several 
potential lines of attack for opponents of these regulations.  In 
 
 77. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001) (holding that extending federal 
regulation over isolated wetlands may unconstitutionally impinge on the states’ 
“traditional and primary power over land and water use.”); but see Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282-83 (1981) 
(rejecting respondents’ argument that “because it regulates a particular land 
use, the Surface Mining Act is beyond congressional Commerce Clause 
authority.”). 
 81. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority’s approach “treats deference under the rationality rule as subject to 
gradation according to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the 
immediate subject of the challenged regulation.”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority achieved its result by 
“supplanting rational basis scrutiny with a new criterion of review”). 
 82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 83. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2). 
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this section, I demonstrate that the constitutional fate of federal 
GHG regulations will depend in large part on four factors: (1) how 
the Court characterizes the challenged regulations; (2) whether 
the present Court continues to extend the “economic endeavor” 
litmus test to future challenges of environmental laws; (3) how 
rigorously the Court adheres to its more constrained 
interpretation of Wickard’s aggregation principle; and (4) how 
stringently the Court applies its requirement that the regulated 
activities have direct, rather than attenuated, effects on 
commerce. 
A. Issue One: How Should the Court Characterize the 
“Object of Regulation”? 
The first and most important step in any constitutional 
challenge will be to define the object of the regulation.84  When it 
comes to environmental regulations in general, and climate 
change laws in particular, this seemingly straightforward step 
becomes considerably more difficult.  Recent decisions in the 
courts of appeals make clear that, in the wake of Lopez and 
Morrison, courts continue to disagree about the proper approach 
to this essential question.  For example, some courts have upheld 
federal environmental laws on the grounds that the statutes’ real 
objects of regulation are natural resources that can generate or be 
traded in interstate commerce.85  Courts have also upheld federal 
environmental laws by casting these laws as direct regulations of 
commercial activities that happen to be associated with negative 
 
 84. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (discussing that to decide whether a federal 
regulation is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Court “would have 
to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially 
affects interstate commerce”). 
 85. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
Endangered Species Act [hereinafter ESA] takings provision as applied to red 
wolves because “with no red wolves, there will be no red wolf related tourism, no 
scientific research, and no commercial trade in pelts”); Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding ESA 
takings prohibition because it “prevents the destruction of biodiversity and 
thereby protects the current and future interstate commerce that relies upon 
it”). 
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environmental impacts.86  In addition, courts have upheld 
environmental laws under the theory that the laws’ primary 
objectives are to protect the interstate market as a whole from a 
harmful “race to the bottom” among the states.87  This third 
approach relies on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, a case in 
which federal regulation of surface mining was upheld, in part, 
because the “prevention of . . . destructive interstate competition 
is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce 
Clause.”88  However, Hodel was decided fourteen years prior to 
Lopez, and so its precedential power is suspect in light of the 
Court’s more recent departure from its traditional Commerce 
Clause analysis.89 
 
 86. See, e.g., Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding that ESA takings prohibition is constitutional, in part, because 
“the regulated activity is the construction of a 202 acre commercial housing 
development” and such an activity is “plainly an economic enterprise”); United 
States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 602 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding application of the 
Clean Air Act [hereinafter CAA] to the defendant because his actions, in 
violation of the Act, “were driven by commercial considerations”); Gibbs, 214 
F.3d at 492 (upholding ESA takings provision because “[t]he protection of 
commercial and economic assets [from predation by red wolves] is a primary 
reason for taking the wolves”). 
 87. See, e.g., Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501 (“Species conservation may unfortunately 
impose additional costs on private concerns.  States may decide to forego or limit 
conservation efforts in order to lower these costs, and other states may be forced 
to follow suit in order to compete.  The Supreme Court has held that Congress 
may take cognizance of this dynamic and arrest the ‘race to the bottom’ in order 
to prevent interstate competition whose overall effect would damage the quality 
of the national environment.”); Ho, 311 F.3d at 603-04 (arguing that CAA 
asbestos standards are constitutional as applied to a defendant, because 
defendant’s violation of the standards harmed the interstate market in asbestos 
removal by giving him a commercial advantage over companies that complied 
with the CAA); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054 (holding that 
“[t]he taking of the [Delhi Sands Flower-Loving] Fly and other endangered 
animals can also be regulated by Congress as an activity that substantially 
affects interstate commerce because it is the product of destructive interstate 
competition”); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1079 (holding that the ESA is 
constitutional, in part, because it aims to prevent a “race to the bottom” among 
states that would “damage the quality of the national environment”) (citing 
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501). 
 88. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 282 (1981). 
 89. Cf. Hodel, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) with Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  See supra 
Part II-B. 
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Other courts of appeals, as well as individual circuit court 
judges, have rejected the approaches described above.90  
Furthermore, the Court’s decisions in Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, 
and Rapanos appear to foreclose the argument that the 
Commerce Clause permits federal regulation of “non-economic” 
activities merely because the regulation of these activities would 
impact the decisions of economic actors or, alternatively, because 
the activities are undertaken for financial gain.91 
In a constitutional challenge to either comprehensive cap-
and-trade or piecemeal CAA regulation of greenhouse gases by 
the EPA, the Court will have relatively few options for 
characterizing the regulated behavior.  The most plausible 
approach would be to characterize the regulated activity as the 
emission, by a person or corporation, of greenhouse gases.  This 
approach would mirror the narrow “intrinsic nature” approach 
embodied in the Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Rapanos 
decisions, rather than the more liberal approach relied upon by 
the Court in Hodel92 and by the circuit court decisions discussed 
above.93 
If the Court decides that a cap-and-trade law or the EPA’s 
GHG rules regulate the emission of GHGs, it will then ask 
whether this activity falls into any of the traditional categories 
reached by the Interstate Commerce Clause.94  Since a law that 
regulates the act of emitting GHGs cannot be said to directly 
regulate either channels, instrumentalities, or persons or things 
 
 90. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“Neither the plain language of the Commerce Clause, nor judicial decisions 
construing it, suggest that . . . Congress may regulate activity . . . solely because 
non-regulated conduct . . . by the actor engaged in the regulated activity will 
have some connection to interstate commerce.”); see also Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d 
at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting)  (finding fault in  the majority approach because 
it “asks whether the challenged regulation substantially affects interstate 
commerce, rather than whether the activity being regulated does so.”) (emphasis 
in original); accord id. at 1159 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
 91. See supra Part II-B-i. 
 92. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282 (finding that “the Commerce Clause [is] broad 
enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water 
pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than 
one State.”). 
 93. See supra notes 86-87. 
 94. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
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in commerce, the Court will be left with only one option: 
determining that this activity “substantially affect[s]” interstate 
commerce.95 
Alternatively, the Court might treat GHG regulations as if 
their object of regulation was “the use of energy in the production 
of electricity, energy-intensive goods, and locomotion” or, more 
simply, “the production of energy for residential and industrial 
uses.”  Under either of these characterizations, the Court would 
construe federal climate change law as if it was directed at the 
economic activities of power plants, factories, and mobile sources 
of GHGs, or the market for goods and services in which these 
entities participate. 
If supporters of GHG regulations prevail in convincing the 
Court that the latter characterization of the regulated activity is 
the most appropriate, their argument that these regulations are 
constitutional will be considerably easier.  A law that regulates 
the production of electricity, or goods that are sold across state 
lines, would undoubtedly qualify as a regulation of “persons or 
things in interstate commerce.”96  Similarly, the cars, trucks, 
trains, boats, and airplanes whose burning of fossil fuels would 
constitute the regulated activity under the latter view of GHG 
regulations would undoubtedly fall within the traditional 
category of “instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”97  As 
discussed above, regulations that target the traditional categories 
of “instrumentalities” and “people or things” in interstate 
commerce are presumptively constitutional.98  However, 
supporters of cap-and-trade cannot be sure that the Supreme 
Court will characterize the object of regulation as they do.  
Therefore, there is a chance that supporters of GHG regulations 
will have to defend the law as a direct regulation of the emission 
of GHGs. 
 
 
 95. Id. at 559. 
 96. Id. at 558. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See supra Part II-B.  Thus far, the Court has not applied its post-Lopez 
“economic endeavor” test to these more well-defined components of interstate 
commerce. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
  
2011] CAP & TRADE MEETS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 307 
 
B. Issue Two: Is the Regulated Activity an “Economic 
Endeavor”? 
Assuming that the Court decides that the object of regulation 
is the emission of GHGs, and that this activity can only be 
regulated on the theory that it “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce,99 the Court will then inquire into whether the 
emission of GHGs is an “economic endeavor.” 
In answer, opponents of GHG regulation will likely argue 
that the emission of greenhouse gases as industrial waste, when 
viewed in isolation, is not a “quintessentially economic” 
activity.100  They could point out that although GHG emissions 
are unavoidable byproducts of burning fossil fuels for energy, the 
rationale of Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Rapanos appears to 
foreclose the argument that all activities which may in some way 
be associated with or undertaken in furtherance of traditionally 
economic activities qualify as economic activities in their own 
right.101  Opponents could also argue that emitting GHGs into 
the atmosphere does not constitute “production, distribution, [or] 
consumption of commodities,” a definition the Raich Court relied 
upon to uphold a federal law banning marijuana possession.102  
Thus, if the regulated activity is characterized, in the first 
instance, as the emission of GHGs, opponents will be able to 
make a strong case that the challenged GHG regulations 
impermissibly target non-economic activities. 
On the other hand, even if the Court decides that cap-and-
trade or EPA-issued GHG rules regulate the emission of GHGs, 
supporters of federal climate change regulations could still put 
forth several arguments in support of the regulatory scheme’s 
constitutionality.  To begin with, supporters of cap-and-trade 
could argue that the Raich Court’s definition of economics103 
should be viewed merely as a recitation of several activities that 
traditionally comprised the class of economic activities, rather 
 
 99. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 100. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). 
 101. See supra Part II-B-ii. 
 102. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 
720 (1966)). 
 103. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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than a limitation on the outer boundaries of the class.  Thus, 
supporters could argue that other types of activities — such as 
the emission of climate-altering pollutants — should be 
considered economic activities, even though they may not have 
been listed in the definition of “economics” that appeared in the 
1966 edition of Webster’s Dictionary.104 
Next, supporters will likely argue that the emission of GHGs 
leads to climate change and ocean acidification — two phenomena 
that will undoubtedly impact economic activities in numerous 
ways.105  Opponents, however, would most likely counter by 
pointing out that the mere fact that a regulated activity exerts 
secondary effects on the economy is not sufficient to render the 
regulated activity itself “economic.”  In support, they could point 
to both Lopez and Morrison, in which the Supreme Court struck 
down two federal laws because they regulated activities whose 
impact on the national economy was secondary and indirect.106 
Supporters could respond, in the alternative, that the 
regulation of GHGs is a regulation of commerce because real, 
active, interstate markets already exist for each of the regulated 
greenhouse gases.  In fact, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, and the other greenhouse gases are already traded across 
state lines because they are useful inputs to a variety of chemical 
 
 104. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25. 
 105. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007) (discussing 
the “serious and well recognized” impacts of climate change on water 
availability, natural ecosystems, the spread of diseases, and sea levels and 
recounting that “[r]emediation costs alone . . . could run well into the hundreds 
of millions of dollars.”).  Importantly, unlike the other air pollutants regulated 
by the CAA (sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, ozone, mercury, and particulate 
matter), the emission of carbon dioxide, methane, or water vapor (the principal 
GHGs) do not necessarily impact the economy directly by increasing the risk of 
respiratory disease (as in the case of ozone and particulates), causing acid rain 
(sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides), or polluting the water (nitrogen oxides and 
mercury) in a given area. Rather, the impact of emitting carbon dioxide, 
methane, or water vapor is mediated through complicated atmospheric and 
biological interactions with aggregate long-term effects like sea level rise and 
increased storm severity that are more easily detectable at a global scale than in 
a local or regional economy. 
 106. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).  See generally supra Part II-B-ii. 
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and industrial processes.107  In light of the fact that these gases 
have value in the interstate economy, supporters could argue that 
the act of emitting GHGs into the air, rather than capturing and 
selling them in the market, is an economic behavior because 
emitters would thus be forgoing the compensation they could 
receive if they captured and sold these gases in the market. 
Even if the Court determines that the activities regulated by 
cap-and-trade or command-and-control regulations are not 
“economic,” it may yet uphold these laws if they comprise 
“essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity,”108 
such that the otherwise constitutional regulatory scheme would 
be undercut if the activities at issue were not regulated.109  In 
order to decide this question, the Court will first determine what 
the larger regulatory scheme is; second, whether this larger 
scheme regulates interstate commerce; and third, whether 
excising the challenged portion of the law would undercut the 
larger scheme.110  This question is largely irrelevant in the case 
of a comprehensive cap-and-trade bill, since a challenge to such a 
 
 107. Carbon dioxide, for example, is used in “refrigeration systems, . . . food 
packaging, beverages, welding systems, fire extinguishers, water treatment 
processes, horticulture, [and] precipitated calcium carbonate for the paper 
industry.”  Marco Mazzotti et al., Mineral Carbonation and Industrial Uses of 
Carbon Dioxide, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON 
DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 321, 332 (Bert Mertz et al., eds. 2005), available 
at http://www.ipcc-wg3.de/publications/special-reports/.files-images/SRCCS- 
Whole Report.pdf.  It also serves as an input for the production of urea, a 
fertilizer, and is used to extract petroleum in a process known as “enhanced oil 
recovery.”  Id.  Methane, which is the principal component of natural gas, is 
traded in large volumes across the United States.  See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, NATURAL GAS EXPLAINED, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_home (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY 
AND DISPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/data_publications/natural_gas_mont
hly/current/pdf/ table_01.pdf.  Nitrous oxide (laughing gas) has long been 
regulated as an anesthetic by the FDA.  Michael J. Murray & William J. 
Murray, Nitrous Oxide Availability, 20 J. CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY 202 (1980).  It is 
also used by the food industry as a propellant in such popular items as whipped 
cream.  Id.  The other GHGs, meanwhile, only exist because industrial chemists 
have synthesized them for use in commercial and industrial applications. 
 108. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 109. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-27. 
 110. See id. at 28-29. 
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law would most likely be framed as an attack upon the entire 
regulatory scheme.  Accordingly, the Raich exception for non-
economic activities would not save a cap-and-trade scheme if the 
Court determines that such a scheme is primarily directed at 
non-economic activity.111 
However, a challenge to EPA’s individual GHG rules would 
fit neatly into the rubric under which the Raich Court analyzed 
the marijuana possession ban contained in the Controlled 
Substances Act.  As in Raich, the Court will likely treat federal 
GHG rules as a single element within a larger regulatory scheme 
— in this case, the Clean Air Act.  Supporters could then argue 
that the CAA itself regulates interstate economic activity: the 
emission of pollutants into the air that can harm public health 
and disrupt natural resources.112  Supporters will have a difficult 
time, however, convincing a court that without EPA’s GHG 
regulations, the overall scheme to protect the economy from the 
effects of pollution would be undermined.  In contrast to the 
possession ban at issue in Gonzales v. Raich, the elimination of 
GHG regulations would not make enforcement of the CAA’s other 
provisions more difficult,113 since none of the EPA’s other 
enforcement programs would be affected if GHG regulations were 
struck down.  For that reason, if the Court concludes that the 
emission of GHGs is not, by its nature, an economic endeavor, it 
is likely to rule that both cap-and-trade and GHG regulations 
under the CAA are unconstitutional. 
 
 
 
 111. The Raich exception would be relevant, however, to an “as-applied” 
challenge to a cap-and-trade bill.  Such a challenge would if a single emitter 
challenged the constitutionality of a future cap-and-trade law as applied to its 
own wholly intra-state or non-economic activity. 
 112. The larger question of whether the CAA as a whole is constitutional after 
Lopez and Morrison is beyond the scope of this Comment.  There are, however, 
other components of the CAA that, I believe, render it less susceptible to attack 
than are the GHG regulations considered here. 
 113. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (“[W]e have no difficulty concluding that 
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the 
CSA.”). 
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C. Issue Three: Does the Regulated Activity, in the 
Aggregate, “Substantially Affect” Commerce in a Direct, 
Unattenuated Manner? 
If the Court agrees with supporters that emitting GHGs is an 
economic activity, it will next inquire whether the activity, in the 
aggregate “substantially affects” interstate commerce in a way 
that is not “attenuated.”114  Opponents will likely point out that 
all U.S. emissions, in the aggregate, amount to less than twenty 
percent of the world’s energy-related emissions.115  Given that 
eighty percent of global GHG emissions would not be affected by 
even the most robust national regulations,116 opponents may 
argue that regulating only U.S. emissions will not substantially 
affect commerce because even if aggregated, these emission 
reductions will not substantially reduce the rate at which our 
climate changes.  Opponents could also argue that the 
uncertainty inherent in climate modeling renders our predictions 
about the effects of global climate change on weather, sea level, 
disease, or insurance costs too speculative and uncertain to 
satisfy Morrison’s requirement that any link to interstate 
commerce not be “attenuated,”117 or the Court’s admonition that 
the Commerce Clause should not be stretched to cover activities 
whose effects on interstate commerce are “so indirect and remote 
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and 
what is local and create a completely centralized government.”118 
In response, supporters of GHG regulations could argue that 
the Supreme Court has so far declined to “adopt a categorical rule 
 
 114. Note that if a court determines as an initial matter that the mere 
emission of GHGs by cars or power plants is not an economic activity, the court 
will not “aggregate” the effects of all these “non-economic” activities when 
assessing whether the regulated activity exerts a “substantial effect” on 
interstate commerce.  See supra Part II-B-ii. 
 115. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2008 7 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/ 
0573(2008).pdf. 
 116. See id. 
 117. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000). 
 118. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. 
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against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity.”119  If 
the challenged cap-and-trade legislation is accompanied by 
congressional findings that the emission of GHGs affects 
interstate commerce,120 supporters could cite these findings to 
support their case.  However, as Morrison demonstrates, the 
presence of findings will not be sufficient to end the debate.  
Supporters may therefore have to defend the argument that the 
emission of GHGs from U.S. sources, if left unchanged, will 
directly affect the climate, alter weather patterns, raise sea level, 
and acidify the oceans.  Each of these changes, supporters could 
argue, will have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by 
increasing the cost of insurance, causing industries and people to 
relocate away from the coasts, or destroying commercial fisheries.  
Throughout, supporters will have to overcome their opponents’ 
allegations that climate science is too uncertain to justify 
anything more than an attenuated or postulated effect on 
interstate commerce by presenting extensive scientific and 
economic evidence to support their contentions. 
It is important to note that supporters’ arguments will be 
more difficult to make with a piecemeal regulatory scheme like 
EPA’s GHG “Tailoring Rule”121 than with a comprehensive, 
aggressive, economy-wide scheme for GHG regulation.  If the 
share of world GHG emissions reached by the challenged 
legislation or regulation falls to ten percent or less of global 
emissions because the challenged law contains generous 
exemptions for specific industries or sources, opponents’ 
argument that the regulated activities will not substantially 
affect the global climate — and through it, interstate commerce 
— will become even stronger. 
 
 119. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
 120. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. § 701 (as passed by the House, June 26, 2009). 
 121. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514-01 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 51, 52, 70, and 71).  The rule limits GHG requirements under the Title V and 
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration programs of the CAA to entities 
emitting over 100,000 tons per year of CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalents) or 
250,000 tons per year (tpy) of GHGs, leaving smaller emitters effectively 
unregulated. 
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Supporters may, ironically, find a better argument for 
regulating U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by resorting to the 
international trade component of Congress’s commerce power.  In 
addition to granting Congress the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, the Commerce Clause also grants Congress the 
authority “to regulate commerce with foreign nations.”122  As a 
general rule, predictions about the net global effect of greenhouse 
gas emissions on weather patterns, sea level rise, and ocean 
acidification are more dependable and less speculative than 
predictions about local or regional effects.123  Therefore, although 
present climate science may not be able to predict with enough 
certainty the effects of a given quantity of GHG emissions upon 
the United States, it may be able to predict, with sufficient 
certainty to pass even a more conservative Supreme Court 
Justice’s sniff test, the likely effect on global trade that will result 
from a given quantity of emissions.  Thus, supporters may wish to 
argue that regulating GHG emissions will affect not only 
interstate commerce, but also international commerce. 
Another counterintuitive argument to buttress supporters’ 
position would focus on some of the positive consequences of 
increasing levels of GHGs in the atmosphere.  For example, 
carbon dioxide (CO2) — the principal GHG — can act as a 
fertilizer for many crops, stimulating faster growth and greater 
yields.124  Many of these crops, such as wheat and barley, are 
themselves commodities that are heavily traded in interstate 
commerce.  Consequently, supporters could argue that any 
increases to CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere which result 
from industrial emissions will directly, and somewhat more 
 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 123. See David A. Randall et al., Models and their Evaluation, in 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 589, 601 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter8.pdf 
(“confidence in the changes projected by global models decreases at smaller 
scales”). 
 124. See generally B.A. Kimball & S.B. Idso, Increasing Atmospheric CO2: 
Effects on Crop Yield, Water Use and Climate, 7 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 55 (1983) 
(finding that increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels will increase 
agricultural yields for some food crops). 
25
  
314 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
predictably, affect the supply of these commodities in national 
and international markets. 
Finally, supporters could argue that the failure to regulate 
industrial emissions of GHGs at the federal level will set off a 
regulatory “race to the bottom” in which states (and the rest of 
the world) will compete for GHG-intensive industries by cutting 
existing GHG requirements or refusing to implement more 
stringent regulations.  This “destructive interstate 
competition,”125 supporters could argue, will impact the interstate 
and international markets for nearly every consumer and 
industrial product that requires energy to produce.  Although this 
kind of argument appears to have fallen out of favor in the 
Supreme Court in recent years, it has never officially been 
overruled.  Indeed, even after Lopez, several courts of appeals 
have relied on this argument to uphold existing environmental 
laws.126 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the previous sections demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Lopez and Morrison have opened several new lines of 
attack for opponents of a cap-and-trade bill or of EPA’s GHG 
rules.  Although it is not clear that these attacks will, in the end, 
carry the day, it is no longer a foregone conclusion that GHG 
regulations will survive a challenge under the Commerce Clause.  
In light of the Court’s post-Lopez shift in Commerce Clause 
 
 125. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282. 
 126. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Congress 
may . . . arrest the ‘race to the bottom’ in order to prevent interstate competition 
whose overall effect would damage the quality of the national environment.”); 
United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 603-04 (5th Cir. 2002) (arguing that CAA 
asbestos standards are constitutional as applied to a defendant, because 
defendant’s violation of the standards harmed the interstate market in asbestos 
removal by giving him a commercial advantage over companies that complied 
with the CAA); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1054 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (Congress may regulate “the product of destructive interstate 
competition . . . .”); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (ESA is constitutional, in part, because it aims to prevent a “race to the 
bottom” among states that would “damage the quality of the national 
environment”) (citing Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
  
2011] CAP & TRADE MEETS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 315 
 
analysis, supporters of federal GHG regulations would do well to 
keep the following recommendations in mind. 
First, supporters should pay careful attention to how the law 
or regulation describes what it regulates.  After Lopez and 
Morrison, a court is much more likely to uphold a measure that 
regulates the production of electricity or goods directly and 
explicitly than it is to uphold one that regulates “quintessentially 
economic” activities127 only indirectly or secondarily — for 
example, by placing limits on the emission of GHGs into the 
atmosphere.  In other words, the law or regulation should make 
clear that its goal is to change the way that electricity or energy-
intensive goods are produced, rather than to alter the 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
Second, authors of cap-and-trade legislation or GHG 
regulations should make detailed findings to support the 
argument that the object of regulation is “economic in nature.”128  
These findings should address the effect of GHG emissions on the 
climate and the resulting impact of climate change and ocean 
acidification on interstate and foreign commerce.  Congressional 
findings should also explicitly link the causes of climate change to 
interstate commercial activities.  In addition, they should 
highlight the existing commodity markets in carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and other regulated gases, and the 
opportunity costs of emitting those GHGs as wastes instead of 
capturing them and supplying them to the market.  These 
findings should also explain how a regulatory “race to the bottom” 
in GHG regulations will have a destructive impact on interstate 
or international commerce.  Although such findings will not 
substitute for the Court’s independent analysis as to whether the 
regulated activities fall within the Commerce Power,129 they will 
certainly add weight to supporters’ arguments and make a 
Commerce Clause challenge less likely. 
 
 127. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). 
 128. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (citing United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995)). 
 129. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2) 
(whether a challenged law constitutionally regulates interstate commerce is a 
“judicial rather than a legislative question [that] can be settled finally only by” 
the Court). 
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Third, the authors of climate legislation or regulations should 
explicitly limit the scope of the regulations to actors who sell 
goods or services into interstate commerce, use inputs obtained 
through interstate commerce, employ individuals who can move 
in interstate commerce, or otherwise substantially affect 
interstate commerce.  Alternatively, they could explicitly exempt 
from regulation any activities that are not undertaken for 
“economic” purposes.  Although such a “jurisdictional element” 
will not necessarily save an otherwise unconstitutional statute, 
the presence of a jurisdictional element could “lend support to the 
argument that [the challenged statute] is sufficiently tied to 
interstate commerce.”130 
Fourth, supporters should push for the greatest possible 
scope of regulation, and avoid exempting large sources of GHGs.  
The only statutes the Court has struck down thus far on 
Commerce Clause grounds have been narrow, single-issue 
regulations that were not integral components of larger 
regulatory schemes.  In contrast, the Court recently upheld a law 
that regulated non-economic activity because it was “an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”131  The 
implication for both legislation and the EPA rules is that the 
broader and more comprehensive the GHG regulatory scheme, 
the more likely it is to be upheld.  Therefore, supporters should be 
wary of piecemeal regulations or schemes that only regulate a 
small subset of interstate economic activities that lead to GHG 
emissions.  Such schemes will be harder to defend as being 
“larger regulation[s] of economic activities”132 for two reasons: 
first, because the Court may perceive their scope as more akin to 
the narrow gun possession and gender-motivated crime statutes 
that were struck down in Lopez and Morrison than to the 
comprehensive and wide-ranging Controlled Substances Act that 
was upheld in Raich; and second, because the argument that the 
 
 130. Id. at 613; See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (questioning the 
constitutionality of the challenged statute because it “has no express 
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm 
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on 
interstate commerce”). 
 131. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 30-32. 
 132. Id. at 24. 
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emissions of GHGs from individual regulated entities will have a 
substantial effect on interstate (or international) commerce will 
be more difficult if only a small percent of total emissions is 
actually regulated.133 
As a last resort, advocates may wish to challenge two of the 
Court’s assumptions in Lopez and Morrison.  First, supporters 
could argue that environmental laws — especially those that 
address nationwide or global-scale problems — should be 
exempted from the Lopez-Morrison framework because federal 
regulation in this area does not invade the traditional regulatory 
sphere of the states134 and cannot be remedied through state-by-
state regulation.  Although it is true that states have typically 
retained control over the water and natural resources contained 
within their borders, it is equally true that this power has yielded 
to federal regulation where intrastate activities could impair (or 
improve) the economies of other states.135  In addition, neither 
climate change nor other regional pollution problems can ever be 
abated by purely local actions or regulations.  Therefore, 
regardless of whether the Founders anticipated the danger that 
climate change, the depletion of the stratospheric ozone, ocean 
acidification, or global habitat destruction would pose to the 
health and livelihoods of Americans (and surely they did not), 
supporters of federal regulation in these areas could argue that 
the essence of the Commerce Clause is the power of the federal 
government to coordinate state actions when intrastate 
regulations alone will not protect the national economy.136  
 
 133. See supra Part III-C. 
 134. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Morrison, 529 
U.S. 611 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577, for the proposition that “[w]ere the 
Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional 
state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial 
activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority 
would blur.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401—7671(q) (2006); Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251—1376 (2006). 
 136. This idea is not unheard of in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  In Hodel, 
the Court pointed out that state-by-state regulations can often have a 
detrimental effect on the national environment because of the tendency of states 
to reduce their environmental regulations in order to attract polluting 
businesses away from neighboring states.  See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282.  The costs 
of anthropogenic climate change and other global pollution problems are often 
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Supporters could argue that a new category — “regulations 
designed to protect the national or international environment 
against destructive interstate competition” — should supplement 
the trilogy of well-established Commerce Clause categories137 
whose regulation the Court treats as presumptively reasonable 
under the Commerce Clause.138 
Second, supporters could point out that the Court’s definition 
of economics is woefully narrow and outdated.  The authors of the 
Constitution could not possibly have anticipated the full impact 
that intrastate activities — even those that fall within “areas of 
traditional state concern”139 — could have on interstate 
commerce.  Moreover, supporters could argue, following Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Morrison, that the distinction between 
“economic” and “non-economic” behavior is too elusive and 
unworkable a basis for limiting the power of the federal 
government.140  As modern social scientists have painstakingly 
pointed out, numerous “areas of traditional state concern,” such 
as crime, education, or family law, exert significant and 
quantifiable effects on interstate commercial outcomes.141  Thus, 
 
realized thousands of miles away or dispersed across the country, while the 
economic benefits of the industries that cause these problems is felt directly 
within the state.  Therefore, nearly every state has the perverse incentive to 
maintain lax regulations on the emission of these global pollutants.  In such a 
scenario only federal preemption can overcome states’ self-interested economic 
incentives to doing nothing about these problems. 
 137. These categories are “instrumentalities,” “channels,” and “persons or 
things” in interstate commerce.  See supra Part II-A. 
 138. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (“Congress has the power to prevent interstate competition that will 
result in the destruction of endangered species just as it has the power to 
prevent interstate competition that will result in harm to the environment”). 
 139. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 611 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577). 
 140. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
numerous studies documenting a tie between education, gun violence, and 
economic prosperity); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing report by the Government Accountability Office detailing economic 
motivations for gender-motivated crimes); see generally Wesley Skogan, Fear of 
Crime and Neighborhood Change, 8 CRIME & JUSTICE 203 (1986) (documenting 
adverse economic effects of crime on neighborhood business development); David 
Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECON. 
1801 (1999) (estimating the effects of education on personal income for specific 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/7
  
2011] CAP & TRADE MEETS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 319 
 
supporters of GHG regulation could argue that the Court’s 
narrow view of what constitutes “commerce” or an “economic 
endeavor”142 ignores the reality that nearly all of the activities 
traditionally regulated by the states — marriage, childbearing, 
education, crime, et cetera — can have profound, predictable, and 
non-trivial impacts on interstate commerce.  Given that this is so, 
supporters could make a strong case for discarding Lopez’s 
“economic endeavor” test as unworkable in light of our modern 
understanding of economics. 
Ultimately, the constitutional fate of federal GHG 
regulations has yet to be determined.  As the previous section 
demonstrates, their fate will depend in large part on the Court’s 
answers to four questions: how to characterize the challenged 
regulations; whether to extend the “economic endeavor” litmus 
test to future challenges of environmental laws; how rigorously to 
adhere to a constrained interpretation of Wickard’s aggregation 
principle; and how stringently to apply the requirement that 
regulated activities must have direct, rather than attenuated, 
effects on commerce.143  However, no matter how the Supreme 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence evolves in the future,144 
 
subgroups of the population); Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for 
Adults and Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1269 (2000) (documenting 
impacts of divorce on economic well-being of adults and children); Jane 
Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's Wages, 62 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 
209 (1997) (exploring different explanations for the observed impact of children 
on women’s income); Marieka M. Klawitter & Victor Flatt, The Effects of State 
and Local Antidiscrimination Policies on Earnings for Gays and Lesbians, 17 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 658 (1998) (documenting the effects of laws banning 
discrimination based on sexual orientation on individual earnings and 
household income); M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 726 (1995) (finding significant 
effects on income from discrimination based on sexual orientation); Robert J. 
Sampson, John H. Laub, & Christopher Wimer, Does Marriage Reduce Crime? A 
Counterfactual Approach to Within-Individual Causal Effects, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 
465 (2006) (documenting the link between marriage and propensity to commit 
crimes). 
 142. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. 
 143. See supra Part III. 
 144. In the six years since the Court last granted certiorari to a Commerce 
Clause challenge it truly could not avoid (Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, decided 
on June 6, 2005), four new justices have joined the Court.  Therefore, even the 
most assiduous Court-watchers can only speculate as to how Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Associate Justices Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena 
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supporters can dramatically improve the likelihood that the 
Court will uphold a cap-and-trade law or EPA-issued GHG rule 
by attending seriously to the issues raised in this Comment. 
 
Kagan will address the thorny questions created by the Court’s decisions in 
Lopez and Morrison. 
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